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A threat to tax morale: the case of Australian higher education policy 
 
Abstract 
This study investigated tax morale among a sample of 447 Australian graduates who 
completed the Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and Actions Survey (Ahmed, 2000) shortly 
after receiving their higher education degrees. Using structural equation modeling 
(AMOS), pathways are mapped out showing linkages from (a) the values that individuals 
hold concerning the kind of society they want to live in, through (b) satisfaction with 
government policy requiring students to pay fees financed through a government loan  
(HECS or the Higher Education Contribution Scheme), to (c) HECS morale, that is, an 
internalized obligation to repay the loan, and finally to (d) tax morale, that is, an 
internalized obligation to pay income tax. Also affecting tax morale indirectly are the 
personal experiences of the new graduates. Those who were dissatisfied with their 
university course and those who were in the process of repaying their loan were more 
opposed to HECS and had lower levels of HECS morale, which in turn, adversely 
affected tax morale. 
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1. Introduction 
A common theme that has run through the tax literature is acknowledgment of an 
internalized willingness to pay tax in the developed democracies of the world, captured in 
this paper through the concept of “tax morale” (Frey, 2003; Lewis, 1982; Schmölders, 
1970; Strümpel, 1969; Torgler, 2001; Vogel, 1974). Tax morale has been defined as the 
intrinsic motivation to pay tax (Frey, 2002) and has been linked by Orvista and Hudson 
(2002) to “civic duty”. Torgler and Murphy (2004) ground the concept further by linking 
it to tax ethics defined by Song and Yarborough (1978) as “the norms of behaviour 
governing citizens as taxpayers in their relationship with government”. Torgler (2003) 
has shown that nations with lower levels of tax morale have higher rates of evasion and 
avoidance. Other researchers have reported that individuals who have low tax ethics and 
low tax morale have a greater propensity to cheat on their tax (for reviews, see Jackson & 
Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). The recurring theme among researchers 
interested in tax morale is that governments and authorities need to cultivate tax morale 
in their taxpaying populations. But how is this done, and more particularly in the context 
of this paper, how is tax morale “undone”? Controversial government policy is often 
linked to the fortunes of politicians. This paper argues that the fortunes of the tax system 
may also suffer as tax morale is eroded by the implementation of policies that never make 
it over the hurdle to win popular support. 
1.1 Theoretical background 
Despite the fact that tax morale is frequently acknowledged as relevant to tax 
compliance, little is known about how it comes into being and how it is best nurtured 
(Feld & Frey, 2002). Frey and his colleagues (Frey, 2003; Frey & Feld, 2002) have used 
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Crowding Theory to explain how the quality of the exchange between citizens and their 
government shapes tax morale. Policy formulation that is inclusive and respectful of 
citizens (for example, the direct democracy processes found among Swiss cantons) is 
likely to elicit higher levels of tax morale because the individual is recognized as part of 
the deliberative process of deciding how taxes should be spent. The notion of 
governments “crowding out the internal motivation to pay tax” describes the exclusion of 
citizens from the deliberative process and the imposition of outside force to ensure that 
taxes are paid.  
The significance of the citizen-government relationship in shaping compliance 
has always occupied a central place in tax compliance research (for example, Lewis, 
1982; Webley, Robben, Elffers, & Hessing, 1991), sometimes with a focus on trust in 
government (Scholz & Lubell, 1998), at other times, fairness in the tax system (Kinsey & 
Grasmick, 1993; Smith & Stalans, 1991). Tyler (1997, 2001) has argued that perceptions 
of justice, particularly procedural justice, are important in ensuring that authorities have 
legitimacy in the eyes of the community. Loss of legitimacy accompanies less moral 
obligation to comply, in this case reduced tax morale. 
But what the government does and how it engages with citizens is unlikely to be 
the only determinant of tax morale. Values, in particular broad social goals about how 
society should be organized and how resources should be distributed are likely to be 
important in explaining individual differences in tax morale within a community 
(Kirchler, 1997; Lewis, 1982). So too are experiential variables. Individuals who feel 
personally disadvantaged and regard the tax system as responsible for their experiences 
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of hardship are more likely to have depleted levels of tax morale (Kirchler, 1997; Scholz 
& Lubell, 1998; Wärneryd & Walerud, 1982).   
1.2 Purpose and context of the current study 
In broad terms, this paper engages with the issue of how aspects of the macro economic 
system shape the behaviours of citizens. This paper purports that tax morale is influenced 
by economic conditions created by government policy, specifically Australia’s higher 
education policy. In particular, we aim to examine the extent to which values, opposition 
to government policy and experiential variables work in concert to shape tax morale 
among Australian graduates. 
In 1989, the federal Labor Government introduced HECS, a scheme that replaced free 
tertiary education with a user-pays system subsidized by government. For the most part, 
Australian higher education institutions are dependent on public funding, and successive 
governments have remained vigilant, keen to reduce the sector’s reliance on the public 
purse wherever possible. Australian students who obtain a satisfactory tertiary entrance 
score can pay their fee contribution up-front and receive a 25% discount or they can take 
out a student loan varying between disciplines, repayable through the Australian Taxation 
Office when their income exceeds a specified threshold level1.  Wage and salary earners 
declare their HECS debt to their employers and the repayment is extracted at source 
along with income tax. Those who are self-employed make their own arrangements for 
repayment with the tax office. 
                                                 
1 The threshold for repayment shifted from $28,495 (1996-97) to $20,701 (1997-98), and again to $25,348 
(2003-04). At the time of this research, the threshold was $21,984 (1999-2000).  
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Explaining tax morale: Opposition to HECS 
On the basis of the arguments of Frey and his colleagues (Frey, 2003; Frey & Feld, 
2002), it might be expected that government policies that are controversial and unpopular 
run the risk of undermining the tax morale of the disaffected population. In other words, 
if a segment of the population is opposed to the HECS, that segment might be expected to 
register a lower level of tax morale than those who are not opposed to the scheme. This 
relationship should exist independent of whether or not the person is carrying a HECS 
debt or has benefited from their tertiary education experience.  
Explaining tax morale: Basic value orientations 
Support for the policy and support for a tax system, however, does not occur in a social 
and political vacuum (Lewis, 1982). Basic value orientations that outline our hopes for 
the society are going to shape attitudes to policy as well as to the tax system (Braithwaite, 
2003). Two value orientations that have been found to underlie the ways in which we 
respond to social-political issues, policies and interventions are the security and harmony 
value orientations (Blamey & Braithwaite, 1997; Braithwaite, 1982, 1994, 1998). This 
two value model, derived from the work of Rokeach (1973), and in accord with the 
conceptual models proposed by others (Katz & Hass, 1988; Lipset, 1963; Rasinski, 1987; 
Scott, 1960), brings together shared social values describing (a) principles for allocating 
resources and regulating human conduct (security value orientation) and (b) principles 
that describe the ways in which we should be connecting and engaging with others and 
our world (harmony value orientation). Security values at the societal level espouse the 
virtue of the rule of law, the desirability of national greatness, national economic 
development and national security, and the role of reward for individual effort as a 
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principle of good governance. Harmony values at the societal level revolve around the 
desirability of a peaceful world, where human dignity is valued and respected, equal 
opportunity and greater economic equality are advanced, and rule by the people and 
international cooperation are the mainstays of social evolution. Also comprising the 
harmony value constellation are values reflecting the preservation of the natural 
environment and support for the arts. 
 Both value orientations are expected to increase tax morale (Braithwaite, 2003, 
2004). Or conversely, when citizens have lost interest in social goals of either a security 
or harmony kind, tax morale can be expected to plummet. In such cases, cynicism has 
taken the place of hope and individuals lack the conviction that paying tax is the way to 
achieve a better society (Braithwaite, 2004). 
 Because HECS is a user pays system replacing one in which access to higher 
education was merit based and free, the harmony and security values are likely to be 
associated not only with tax morale, but also opposition to HECS. Those with a strong 
allegiance to harmony values would be expected to oppose HECS because it undermines 
the principle of equality of opportunity for all. Those strongly supporting security values 
are likely to be more comfortable with a user pays system and support HECS. Whether it 
is welfare or higher education, those who are security oriented have doubts about the 
desirability of making goods and services freely available without requiring the input of 
initiative or effort. It is of particular interest that while the security value orientation is 
predicted to boost support for HECS policy as well as the tax system, the harmony value 
orientation is predicted to be at odds with HECS policy, but to boost tax system support. 
How this cognitive dissonance is resolved is a question addressed in this research. 
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Explaining tax morale: A spill-over from HECS to tax? 
At one level, cognitive dissonance between attitudes to government policy and attitudes 
to tax are common events. In a simple two party democratic political system, a 
substantial proportion of citizens spend a substantial proportion of their lives living with 
policies that they do not particularly like. The question then is what are the strategies that 
individuals use to ensure that disaffection with policy does not spill over into disaffection 
with the democratic system, and more particularly the tax system. One possibility is 
psychological containment or segmentation. Opposition to HECS might lead to the 
feeling that one is not obligated to pay one’s HECS debt, but the loss of morale does not 
extend beyond the HECS domain. In such circumstances, tax morale might be expected 
to be robust, protected against domain discontent and low morale in relation to paying 
HECS.  
Alternatively, opposition to a policy might not only lower one’s feelings of 
obligation to the authority in that domain, but in other domains as well. Nadler (2002) 
refers to this as the “flouting” hypothesis. When individuals perceive one law to be 
unjust, the resulting resistance extends beyond this specific law to other laws as well. 
Thus, if law A is regarded as unjust, citizens will be less willing to cooperate with law B. 
The injustice of the first law taints the second to such an extent that individuals will 
develop a flouting response to law more broadly.  
1.3 Testing a research model 
The model that is tested in this paper therefore has three theoretically important elements: 
(a) values, (b) HECS related attitudes and (c) tax morale. First, the question asked is how 
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do security and harmony values frame the attitudes and cognitions that individuals hold 
in relation to HECS. These attitudes and cognitions are conceptualized in terms of two 
dimensions. The first is opposition to HECS as the government policy that has been 
implemented to fund higher education. The second is HECS morale, or the degree to 
which people have internalized their formal obligation to pay HECS, accepting this as a 
responsibility and the right thing to do. 
The next stage of the model involves linking opposition to HECS and HECS 
morale with tax morale. Of critical importance from a cognitive dissonance perspective 
is whether low HECS morale “spills over” into low tax morale or whether 
psychologically speaking, there is a mental divide between the university and the 
government.  
In addition to testing this model, we have the capacity to address three alternative 
explanations as to why HECS morale and tax morale might be correlated. Value 
orientations represent one possible source of confounding as already discussed. A second 
is personal hardship. HECS morale and tax morale may both be low because a person is 
struggling financially. Any financial outlay – whether for HECS or tax – diminishes an 
individual’s disposable income.  Thus, personal experiences that may sour relationships 
with the university and the state (e.g., being financially constrained in what one studied, 
being dissatisfied with one’s course, paying more for one’s course, paying a HECS debt, 
receiving a low income after graduation) are included in the model to be tested. The third 
possible confounding variable is age. Those who are older tend to report higher tax 
morale (see reviews of Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). It seems 
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plausible that older Australians also will have a more secure financial situation and feel 
less threatened and disadvantaged by the HECS system. 
2. Method 
2.1 Sample  
The data used in this paper are collected from 447 Australian graduates who completed 
the Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and Actions Survey in 2000 (GHVA Survey; Ahmed 
2000; Ahmed, 2004). New graduates whose degrees were conferred in either 1998 or 
1999 were selected for this study as they were expected to have commenced employment 
by the time the survey was mailed out. The sample was stratified in terms of students 
graduating from each discipline in two universities in the Australian Capital Territory.  
Of the 1500 questionnaires distributed, 447 were returned after several reminders, giving 
a response rate of 33 per cent (after allowing for undelivered questionnaires and 
ineligible respondents). This response rate, while low in absolute terms, is comparable 
with rates reported for other tax based surveys (Pope, Fayle, & Chen 1993; Kirchler 
1999; Wallschutzky 1996; Webley, Adams, & Elffers 2002). Wallschutzky (1996) has 
argued that tax surveys of the general population cannot be expected to yield higher than 
a 30 to 40 per cent response rate. 
2.2 Procedure 
The participants were initially sent an introductory letter explaining the intent of the 
survey and guaranteeing strict confidentiality of responses. The introductory letter 
explained that the purpose of the survey was to understand how graduates viewed the 
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HECS, how they felt about their tertiary education experiences, and how they would 
describe their taxpaying behaviour. 
After one week, the survey questionnaire was sent along with an accompanying letter and 
a postage-paid return envelope. The accompanying letter emphasized the research 
purpose, reiterated the guarantee of respondent anonymity, and encouraged respondents 
to return the completed questionnaire in a sealed envelope. A two-week return date was 
requested. An identification number appeared in the questionnaire to allow follow-up 
reminders of non-respondents asking them to complete and mail the survey if they had 
not already done so. As recommended by Dillman (1991), a reminder postcard was sent 
out one week after the initial mailing. Three weeks later, an identical packet was sent out 
to those participants who had not returned the questionnaire. 
2.3 Measures 
The GHVA Survey was based largely on the Community Hopes, Fears, and Actions 
Survey (CHFA Survey; Braithwaite, 2000) with some additional items included to assess 
moral obligation in relation to paying tax as well as repaying a HECS debt, perception of 
the desirability and practicability of HECS program, and an evaluation of university 
courses. The measures which provide the data base for the current analyses are described 
below.  
Tax morale: 
The tax morale scale comprised 8 items measuring the extent to which graduates 
expressed commitment to the tax system and a belief that taxpaying is socially 
responsible: (a) Paying tax is the right thing to do; (b) Paying tax is a responsibility that 
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should be willingly accepted by all Australians; (c) Citizenship carries with it a duty to 
pay tax; (d) Citizenship carries with it a shared responsibility between Government and 
citizen; (e) I believe paying tax is good for our society, and therefore it is good for each 
of us; (f) It’s disappointing that some people do not pay their tax; (g) It makes it difficult 
to govern the country when people don’t pay their tax; and (h) The harm to the 
community through people not paying tax is regretful.  
There were five response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree (M = 4.10; SD = .54; alpha = .86). A higher score on this scale 
indicates higher tax morale.  
HECS opposition: 
This scale comprised 9 items measuring the extent to which graduates regarded HECS as 
an undesirable way of funding higher education: (a) The HECS should be abolished; (b) 
People are not satisfied with the HECS; (c) The HECS favors the rich over the poor; (d) 
The HECS is functioning very well as it is (reverse coded); (e) In general, the HECS is a 
fair system (reverse coded); (f) People are very resentful about repaying a HECS debt; 
(g) There are more negatives than positives in the HECS; (h) When I think about 
repaying a HECS debt, I feel as if I am losing out; and (i) In general, I don’t think of the 
benefits – I just see the HECS as taking money from my pocket.  
There were six response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly 
disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree (M = 3.40; SD = 1.21; alpha = 
.94). A higher score on this scale indicates higher opposition to HECS.  
HECS morale: 
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The HECS morale scale comprised 8 items measuring the extent to which graduates 
expressed commitment to repaying HECS and a belief that it was the socially responsible 
thing to do. The items are: (a) Repaying a HECS debt is the right thing to do; (b) 
Repaying a HECS debt is a responsibility; (c) Repaying one’s HECS debt ultimately 
advantages future students; (d) One should repay the HECS debt and share in the cost of 
providing education; (e) Not repaying the HECS debt is violating the right of future 
students; (f) It’s disappointing that some graduates do not repay their HECS debt; (g) The 
community loses benefit because some graduates do not repay their HECS debt; and (h) 
Graduates who do not repay their HECS debt spoil things for future students.  
There were six response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly 
disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree (M = 4.28; SD = 1.07; alpha = 
.92)2. A higher score on this scale indicates higher HECS morale.  
Security and harmony scales: 
These scales are taken from the Goal, Mode and Social Values Inventories (Braithwaite 
and Law, 1985). Respondents were asked: “... Please indicate the extent to which you 
accept or reject each of the following as principles that guide your judgments and actions. 
Do this by circling the number that comes closest to the way you feel about each goal.”  
The security scale (Braithwaite, 2000) comprised the following five items: (a) National 
greatness (being a united, strong, independent, and powerful nation); (b) Reward for 
individual effort (letting individuals prosper through gains made by initiative and hard 
                                                 
2 The tax morale scale was based on work from the CHFA Survey in the general population while the 
HECS morale scale was developed specifically for use in the graduate population. The different metrics of 
the tax morale scale and the HECS morale scale reflect the fact that the scales were developed in different 
research contexts. 
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work); (c) National security (protection of your nation from enemies); (d) The rule of law 
(punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent); and (e) National economic 
development (having greater economic progress and prosperity for the nation). 
The harmony scale (Braithwaite, 2000) comprised the following 11 items: (a) A good life 
for others (improving the welfare of all people in need); (b) Rule by the people 
(involvement by all citizens in making decisions that affect their community); (c) 
International cooperation (having all nations working together to help each other); (d) 
Social progress and reform (readiness to change our way of life for the better); (e) A 
world at peace (being free from war and conflict); (f) A world of beauty (having the 
beauty of nature and the arts: music, literature, art, etc.); (g) Human dignity (allowing 
each individual to be treated as someone of worth); (h) Equal opportunity for all (giving 
everyone an equal chance in life); (i) greater economic equality (lessening the gap 
between the rich and the poor); (j) preserving the natural environment (preventing the 
destruction of nature’s beauty and resources); and (k) Freedom (being able to live as you 
choose whilst respecting the freedom of others). 
There were seven response categories: 1 = reject, 2 = inclined to reject, 3 = neither reject 
nor accept, 4 = inclined to accept, 5 = accept as important, 6 = accept as very important, 
7 = accept as of utmost importance. The descriptive statistics for the security scale (M = 
5.16; SD = .94; alpha = .79) and harmony scale (M = 5.89; SD = .76; alpha = .90) were 
comparable to the statistics obtained from the general taxpaying population [(M = 5.64; 
SD = .97; alpha = .83) and (M = 5.72; SD = .84; alpha = .87), respectively]. 
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Having a HECS liability:  
This was assessed using a single item: “Do you have a HECS debt?” (yes = 1, no = 2; 
reverse coded for analyses). Of the total sample, 65% had a HECS debt and 35% had 
paid their tuition fees upfront3. Among those who claimed to pay upfront, 67% made the 
full payment and 33% chose the partial upfront payment option. Of those who had paid 
upfront, 65% reported that they were self-funding, 25% that their parents paid for them, 
and 10% that employers paid for them. Readers should be cautious in interpreting these 
figures because the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a respondent’s 
upfront payment can be made by parents at first, then by the student, and finally by the 
employer (for further details, see Ahmed, 2004).  
Course satisfaction: 
The majority of items used in this scale were adapted from the Graduate Experience 
Questionnaire (Long & Hillman, 2000).  
Seventeen items comprising the measure covered four aspects of the university 
experience: (a) skill acquisition (4 items; a sample item: “The course helped me develop 
the ability to plan my own work”; M = 4.62; SD = .79; alpha = .81); (b) professional 
development4 (7 items; a sample item: “The course helped me to grow professionally”; M 
= 4.17; SD = .92; alpha = .86); (c) quality teaching (4 items; a sample item: “My 
lecturers were extremely good at explaining things”; M = 3.62; SD = 1.06; alpha = .89); 
                                                 
3 This survey seems to over-represent those who had paid upfront fees (35%) compared to the 26% in the 
study by Kim (1997). 
4 This aspect was developed for the present study. 
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and (d) clear course-goals (2 items; a sample item: “It was often hard to discover what 
was expected of me in this course” (reverse coded); M = 3.73; SD = 1.09; alpha = .68).  
There were six response categories for all items in this measure: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 
= disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree.  
Because these four scales were significantly and positively interrelated (the correlation 
coefficients ranged from .26 to .51, p < .001), they were combined into one scale to 
measure respondents’ satisfaction with higher education (see Appendix for full listing of 
items). 
Cost salience:  
To assess the salience of the cost of university courses for respondents, the following two 
questions were asked: Did your financial circumstances influence your (a) choice of 
course? and (b) choice of university? (yes = 1, no = 2). Responses to these two items 
were reverse scored so that a higher score indicates cost was an issue influencing 
students’ enrolment and/or choice of university. Because scores on these two items were 
significantly and positively correlated (r = .35; p < .001), they were averaged to produce 
one score (M = 1.21; SD = .32; alpha = .50).  
Personal income:  
Personal income was measured by asking respondents to tick the income range to which 
they belonged: (a) less than $20,000 (covered 8.7% of the sample); (b) $20,001 - 30,000 
(covered 9.7% of the sample); (c) $30,001 - $50,000 (covered 55.8% of the sample; (d) 
$50,001 - $75,000 (covered 20.3% of the sample); (e) $75,001 - $100,000 (covered 3.4% 
of the sample); and (f) more than $100,000 (covered 2.2% of the sample). To reduce 
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skewness in the scale, two response categories (“$75,001 - $100,000” and “more than 
$100,000”) were collapsed into one category.  
Age, sex and field of study: 
Respondents’ age was measured in years. Sex was scored 1 for male and 2 for female. To 
measure respondents’ field of study5 at the undergraduate level, they were asked: Which 
out of the following broad disciplines best describes your area of study? (1 = Arts, 
education, nursing; 2 = Science, engineering, agriculture, architecture, 
business/economics; 3 = Law, medicine, vet science; 4 = Combined degree; 5 = Other). 
Field of study was transformed into four dummy variables: (a) Arts, education, nursing 
(Band 1); (b) Science, engineering, agriculture, architecture, business/economics (Band 
2); (c) Law, medicine, vet science (Band 3); and (d) combined degree. Responses to 
category ‘Other’ were coded into the above categories. 
3. Results 
3.1 Correlational analyses 
In order to examine the relationships among the key variables at a bivariate level, two 
sets of Pearson-product moment correlations were calculated. In Table 1, social 
demographic variables and financial hardship variables are correlated with opposition to 
HECS, HECS morale and tax morale.  
Older respondents were more opposed to HECS but had higher tax morale than younger 
respondents. Sex and field of study were not important correlates of either HECS 
                                                 
5 This was included as a control variable in the analyses below. HECS charges can vary across field of 
study, and the size of the HECS debt may also affect respondents’ perceptions of HECS policy. 
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attitudes or HECS morale or tax morale, although those doing basic Arts courses (the 
cheapest courses) were more opposed to HECS policy. Those who had lower personal 
income also were more opposed to HECS policy. Respondents who were carrying a 
HECS debt had significantly lower HECS morale. HECS morale was also notably lower 
among those who evaluated their university course negatively. Most notably, those who 
evaluated their university course negatively were more opposed to HECS policy, had 
lower HECS morale and lower tax morale.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
In Table 2, the intercorrelations for the security and harmony value scales, the HECS 
opposition scale, the HECS morale scale and the tax morale scale are provided. These 
coefficients support the hypothesized relationships at the bivariate level: 
(a) Security values are negatively related to opposition to HECS and positively 
related to both HECS morale and tax morale. 
(b) Harmony values are positively related to opposition to HECS, negatively related 
to HECS morale and positively related to tax morale. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Also of importance are the relationships among the three variables – opposition to 
HECS, HECS morale and tax morale. Understanding what these relationships mean, 
however, is impossible at the bivariate level because of the influence of other variables. 
To tease out these interrelationships further, a multivariate procedure is required. 
Therefore, a path analysis – which belongs to the family of statistical techniques referred 
to as Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) – was used to take account of the inter-
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relationships among all the variables that were significantly related to tax morale and/or 
HECS morale in the preceding bivariate analyses.  
3.2 Path analysis 
Figure 1 shows the diagrammatic representation of the results of the path analysis6 using 
AMOS version 4.0 with maximum likelihood estimation (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 
As evident from Figure 1, the path analysis shows four variables having direct 
effects on tax morale. Those who are older and those who support harmony values have 
higher levels of tax morale. Tax morale surprisingly is also strengthened by HECS 
opposition. This finding, which was not hypothesized, most likely reflects the position 
that a significant proportion of Australians (and others) espouse: Education should be 
available to all and paid for by higher taxes if necessary (Johnstone, 2003; Marginson, 
1997; Evatt Foundation Group, 1999; Wilson & Breusch, 2003). Thus, opposition to 
HECS can strengthen commitment to the tax system. 
 The major variable lowering tax morale in Figure 1 is HECS morale. This model 
provides evidence of Nadler’s (2002) flaunting response: Once individuals free 
themselves of an internal obligation to repay their HECS, their internal motivation to pay 
taxes is also weakened. 
                                                 
6 Social demographic variables that did not play a significant role in the path analysis were excluded from 
the final model. These were sex, field of study (coded Band 1 versus others), cost salience, and personal 
income. Their exclusion did not affect the magnitude of the coefficients of the variables included in the 
model. 
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 The other aspect of the path diagram in Figure 1 that is of significance is the 
central role played by opposition to HECS policy. Such opposition arises out of personal 
circumstance and social values. Those who have a HECS debt, who are not satisfied with 
their university course, and those who are older7 are more strongly opposed to HECS 
than others. Also fueling opposition are harmony values. Security values act in the 
opposite direction, engendering support for the HECS program. 
This somewhat pivotal variable of opposition to HECS policy maintains its very 
strong link to HECS morale in the path diagram. Opposition to HECS weakens the 
internalized responsibility to pay HECS. HECS morale also is adversely affected by 
having a HECS debt and course dissatisfaction. And HECS morale, or the loss of HECS 
morale, appears to be the greatest threat to tax morale in Figure 1. 
Overall, the final model provided an excellent fit to the empirical data as shown 
by seven different goodness-of-fit indices8. All fit statistics are presented in Table 3 
including the significant paths in the final model with their standardized beta coefficients. 
As Table 3 presents, the chi-square was non-significant [χ2 (9, N = 442) = 11.21, p < 
.26], the chi-square/df ratio was 1.25, the GFI was .994, the AGFI was .975, the CFI was 
                                                 
7 This relationship was not anticipated. Possibly older respondents compare the present with the past when 
a university education was free. Younger respondents have no experience with a free university education 
system.  
8 The traditional goodness-of-fit index is the chi-square which is smaller and non-significant for better-
fitting models. Because chi-square is likely to increase with the degrees of freedom and the sample size 
even when the model fit is imperfect, we have utilized 6 additional indices of model fit to evaluate the 
model (for discussion of their relative merits, see Byrne, 1994; Loehlin, 1998). These are chi-square/df 
ratio, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
a Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). A chi-square/df 
ratio of less than 2 is considered as acceptable. Values greater than .95 for GFI, AGFI, GFI, and TLI are 
considered to indicate good model fit (Byrne, 1994; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Loehlin, 1998). An RMSEA of 
.05 or less is suggested as an indicator of acceptable fit (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999; Bollen, 1989). 
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.996, the TLI was .988, and the RMSEA was .024. The modification indices indicated no 
potential improvement in the model fit with either the elimination or addition of paths. 
The path analysis explained moderate levels of variance were explained in policy 
discontent (R2 = .16) and tax morale (R2 = .15) while a substantial amount of variance 
was explained in HECS morale (R2 = .47).  
INSERT TABLE 3 
Discussion 
This paper addresses the issue of tax morale and how it can be jeopardized by 
controversial government policy. The context is specific and should be acknowledged as 
such at the outset. The context sets limitations on the generalizability of the findings. A 
further caveat is warranted at this point. While the HECS morale and tax morale 
relationship continues to be significant after controlling for the effects of values, personal 
hardship and age, it should not be construed as the last word on the matter. No claim can 
be made that there are no alternative explanations for the spill-over effect. All that can be 
claimed is that progress has been made toward rigorously ruling out some alternative 
explanations and showing that the spill-over effect remains significant. 
In spite of these limitations, the centrally important result that dissatisfaction with HECS 
policy undermines an obligation to pay HECS, which, in the present research, 
undermines an obligation to pay tax gives rise to a substantively important further 
research question for economic psychology. The question involves the yet poorly 
theorized link between macro-economic policy and micro-behaviour, mediated by legal 
institutions. The challenge in advancing this research agenda is in theorizing the 
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interaction between the individual’s psychology of flouting or reacting against the law or 
government or both, and designing institutions that permit or prevent this behaviour. The 
issue is complex. For instance, in the present context, it is quite difficult for those 
respondents who are wage and salary earners to escape paying HECS. Perhaps if they 
were “free” in Kirchler’s (1999) reactance terms to escape the HECS net, low HECS 
morale would be dissipated, and there would be less spill-over to lower tax morale. There 
would also be less HECS paid, of course. But under which institutional set-up is the tax 
system healthier, not only in the short-term but in the long-term? We cannot answer this 
question. The current research findings, however, challenge the growing popularity and 
presumed desirability of HECS-like schemes and hypothecated taxes among tax 
administrators and scholars around the world. Specifically, what we need to understand 
in theory and practice is what are the institutional arrangements that lubricate a flouting 
response, what arrangements will defuse it, and what is the best we can do to contain its 
spread. If Frey and his colleagues (Frey, 2002, 2003; Frey & Feld, 2002) are right, the 
answer is discursive, and involves government winning over the hearts and minds of the 
people. Most tax administrators, however, would prefer a technical solution since they 
have no control over the political process as such. It is an empirical question, however, 
whether or not technology can quell flouting. To the extent that flouting is associated 
with reactance, attempted control may aggravate rather than alleviate threats to tax 
morale.  
 While the link between HECS morale and tax morale is of central importance 
because of its policy relevance, other findings in this paper demonstrate the principles by 
which economic and psychological variables work together to shape tax morale.  Values, 
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in the form of shared goals about the kind of society we consider desirable, play an 
important part in influencing views of policies such as HECS and taxation more 
generally, and these influences prevail after controlling for variables that reflect self-
interest. By the same token, self-interest is important. Those who were not satisfied with 
their university course and who have a HECS debt not only oppose HECS but also feel 
less willing to meet their obligations to pay HECS. Together these findings show that 
neither HECS morale, nor tax morale can be explained satisfactorily in either self-
interested or collective terms. Both kinds of influence are at work. Because they endure 
over time, values act as a stabilizing influence, giving tax morale a certain kind of 
robustness against controversy and upheaval. Personal circumstances and opposition to 
particular government policies, in contrast, are destabilizing influences, causing tax 
morale to fluctuate. As such, tax morale may not only be an important determinant of 
compliance, but also a useful barometer for judging how the tax system is going. Tax 
morale will build up in good times, be eroded in bad times, but withstand policy 
controversy as long as adjustments are made to restore morale to the level necessary for a 
well-functioning democracy. 
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Appendix 
Course satisfaction: 
Skill acquisition 
The skill acquisition scale items: 
(1) The course developed my problem-solving skills; (2) The course sharpened my 
analytic skills; (3) The course improved my skills in written communication; and (4) The 
course develop the ability to plan my own work. 
Professional development 
The professional development scale items: 
(1) The course helped me to develop a well-defined career goal; (2) The course brought a 
sense of achievement; (3) The skills I achieved during my course are now useless 
(reverse coded); (4) The course helped me to grow professionally; (5) the course helped 
me to get the best kind of job easily; (6) The course facilitated my employment level; and 
(7) The course helped me to relate knowledge with practice. 
Quality teaching 
The quality teaching scale items: 
 (1) My lecturers were extremely good at explaining things; (2) The teaching staff of this 
course motivated me to do my best work; (3) The staff put a lot of time into commenting 
on my work; and (4) The teaching staff normally gave me helpful feedback on how I was 
going. 
Clear course-goals 
The clear course-goals scale items: 
(1) It was often hard to discover what was expected of me in this course (reverse coded); 
and (2) It was always easy to know the standard of work expected. 
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Table 1. Correlation coefficients between “Social demographic characteristics and 
hardship variables”, and opposition to HECS, HECS morale and Tax morale 
 
Social demographic characteristics 
and hardship variables   
Opposition to 
HECS 
HECS Morale Tax Morale 
Age .18*** -.05 (ns) .16*** 
Sex -.01 (ns) .01 (ns) -.04 (ns) 
Field of study    
 Arts, education, nursing .14** -.07 (ns) .02 (ns) 
 Science, engineering, business -.07 (ns) .06 (ns) .04 (ns) 
 Law, medicine -.06 (ns) .03 (ns) .00 (ns) 
 Combined degree -.05 (ns) -.01 (ns) -.07 (ns) 
Cost salience .09 (ns) -.07 (ns) .00 (ns) 
Personal income -.10* .07 (ns) .04 (ns) 
HECS debt .06 (ns) -.17*** -.04 (ns) 
Course satisfaction -.12** .20*** .09* 
* p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Intercorrelations among Value scales, HECS opposition, HECS morale and Tax 
morale 
 
Variables  1 2 3 4 
1. Harmony values          -    
2. Security values .25***           -   
3. HECS opposition .24*** -.15**        -  
4. HECS morale -.13** .28*** -.64*** - 
5. Tax morale .16*** .20*** .05 .27*** 
 
** p <.01, *** p < .001 
 29
 
Table 3. Paths in the final model with their standardized beta coefficients including the 
overall fit indices for the model 
 
Paths in the final model Standardized beta 
coefficients 
HECS morale → Tax morale .39*** 
HECS opposition → Tax morale .13* 
Harmony value orientation → Tax morale .17*** 
Age → Tax morale .14** 
HECS opposition → HECS morale -.60*** 
HECS liability → HECS morale -.13*** 
Security value orientation → HECS morale .18*** 
Course satisfaction → HECS morale .07* 
Security value orientation → HECS opposition -.20*** 
Harmony value orientation → HECS opposition .27*** 
Course satisfaction → HECS opposition -.14** 
HECS liability → HECS opposition .10* 
Age → HECS opposition .23*** 
Chi-square (χ2) 1.21 (df = 9; p < .26)
Chi-square/df ratio 1.25 
GFI (Goodness of Fit Index) .994 
AGFI (Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index) .975 
CFI (Comparative Fit Index) .996 
TLI (Tucker Lewis Index) .988 
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation) .024 
*p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p < .001 
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Tax Morale
Age
HECS Debt
Course Satisfaction
Security Values
Harmony Values
HECS 
Oppostion
HECS 
Morale
.14
.23
.10
-.13
.07
-.14
-.20
-.60
.18
.27
.17
.13
.39
 
Figure 1. Results of a path analysis showing the interrelationships among relevant variables 
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